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Abstract 
The authorfocuses on the impact of glo- 
balization on dz%ferent aspects of civil 
society. He argues that the global divi- 
sion of labour, and the exodus of tran- 
snational corporations has resulted in a 
new configuration of the forces of inte- 
gration and fragmentation of regional 
economies. Postmodemist emphasis on 
heterogeneity and uniqueness of cul- 
tural life has given the Radical Right 
justification for excluding attention to 
those considered as cultural minorities. 
Rather, we are reduced to a common 
denominator of economic strength as 
the only criterion of value and legiti- 
macy. 
Le point de mire de cet article est l'im- 
pact de laglobalisation sur les diprents 
aspects de la socittd civile. L'auteur dt- 
veloppe une argumentation selon la- 
quelle la division globule du travail et 
l'exode des entreprises supranationales 
aentraint unefragmentation des dcono- 
mies rtgionales et une reconfiguration 
des forces d'intdgrations. L'emphase 
pos tmodemiste mise sur le caractPre h la 
fois hittrogPne et unitaire de la vie cul- 
turelle a fourni h la Droite Radicale des 
justifications pour marginaliser ceux 
que l'on considbe comme faisant partie 
des minoritb culturelles. Pire, nous en 
sommes riduits h considker le dbomi- 
nateur commun de la puissance icono- 
mique comme le critPre exclusifde toute 
valeur et de toute ldgitimitt. 
The modem state owes its distinctive 
form to the ways in whichit answers to 
the articulation of an industrial soci- 
ety. In short, the polity, economy and 
sociocultural institutions of modem 
society have assumed particular 
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constellations at given stages of mer- 
cantile, industrial and post-industrial 
capitalism.' Whenever these constel- 
lations of capitalism begin to shift, we 
are driven to examine their history or 
genealogy in order to estimate their 
probable path. To delimit the contest- 
ing discourses that emerge in a period 
of paradigm shift, we are obliged to 
take a stand on the base grammar of 
capitalism. Quite bluntly, as socio- 
logists we cannot entertain the 
postmodern carnival of knowledge 
thrown up in the cultural sector of 
post-industrial capitalism, while in the 
economic and political sectors, the 
discourse of the market assumes an 
unalloyed hegemony in the re- 
articulation of our state and civic insti- 
tution~.~ The globalized imperatives of 
the current stage of capitalism display 
none of the celebrated features of 
postmodemism-of subjectivity, of 
decentering, of pluralism, or of decon- 
structed racism and genderism. These 
are merely the ideological effects 
through which individuals mis- 
recognize the evacuation of capital 
power from these very sites. 
Where nothing is contested by capi- 
talist interests, nothing is gained by 
identification with the fallout from the 
erasure and realignment of institu- 
tional relations demanded periodi- 
cally by capitalist elites. If this were not 
so, we should have to believe that capi- 
talist culture is a benignly self-ana- 
lyzing culture either open to its 
consumers through the rhetoric of any 
of its commodities, or else intelligible 
to critics through its film, music, art 
and literature. On this view, Marx 
would have done better at a rock con- 
cert or a film festival than in the British 
Museum and Freud would have 
learned more in a sex shop than in 
analysis. But in fact the critical acclaim 
of Marx and Freud arises from that 
shift in cultural reflexivity we owe to 
their respective analyses of how we, 
appropriate capital and sexuality. We 
now see them as structures and histo- 
ries of (un)consciousness that shape 
the grammar of our lives. From this 
critical perspective, every shift in the 
institutional forces of capitalism offers 
us an opportunity to deepen our igno- 
rance of those forces. Indeed, our con- 
temporary ignorance is guaranteed if 
we proliferate difference and drift de- 
spite the overwhelming global practice 
of mergers that narrow the rest of our 
practices. 
The global division of labour, the 
exodus of transnational corporations 
whose decisions offset thenation state, 
has resulted in a new configuration of 
the forces of integration and fragmen- 
tation within and between regional 
economies. Yet, despite the celebrants 
of postmodem diversity, it is precisely 
Euro-American culture that provides 
the dominant narrative of global capi- 
talism. This is because global capital- 
ism is still capitalism whose global 
consistency still generates contradic- 
tions, foreclosures and marginaliza- 
tion. The flexibility of global capital 
may well demand flexibility from its 
symbolic analysts but it just as cer- 
tainly instills docility in its service-end 
producers. The much vaunted flexibil- 
ity of postmodem culturalism either 
celebrates or else merely reflects its 
own subject-position within global 
capitalism. As I see it, the fragmenta- 
tion of the Westem canon is largely the 
product of franchising struggles be- 
tween petty cultural capitalists striv- 
ing to position themselves amidst the 
global restructuring of the knowledge, 
information and entertainment indus- 
tries. The artful postmodern and 
deconstructionist practices of desta- 
bilizing the language of property, the 
proper, the lily-white, does not alter 
the system of inequality in which the 
discourse of property pervades every 
institution and level of everyday life in 
capitalist society. Moreover, the sites 
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of these cultural tactics remain aloof 
from the majority of poor people, 
working poor and welfare poor. 
Class Not Culture 
Today, we are told by the New Right 
that our civic covenant is an immoral 
and profligate exercise that can only be 
indulged by the nation state through 
the blindness of its politicians to the 
new world order. In an explosion of 
Darwinistic fervour, we are called to 
believe that a sudden shift in our 
economic environment has left every 
one of our social institutions obso- 
lete-except for the market. Only by 
downsizing our moral and political 
baggage can we enjoy the proper 
release of that lean and mean indi- 
vidual energy that is demanded and 
rewarded by the market. In short, glo- 
bal capitalism remoralizes us by re- 
turning us to a state of nature from 
which it then draws us in accordance 
with the absolute law that our industry 
be ruled by a cognitive elite. To under- 
stand what institutional re-orientation 
is involved here, we need to remind 
ourselves of the social compact that is 
now under reconstruction-if not 
dismantling. 
Production relations generate class 
relations and state/economy relations. 
Production is primary in the material 
sense but not necessarily politically. 
This is because the liberal state is pre- 
supposed in the dominance of indus- 
trial over mercantile and agrarian 
capitalism. The liberal state may also 
be engaged as an imperial nation-state 
on behalf of the mass production phase 
of capitalism in which class relations 
are harmonised through a national 
pact between business, labour and 
government: 
A certain kind of political culture is, 
indeed, a condition for tripartism, 
one in which the state is regarded 
both as the instrument of civil society 
and at the same time as the agency 
for harmonizing civil society's diver- 
gent interests. Government is 
thought of both as the channel for 
procuring satisfaction for separate 
interests and as a force constraining 
these interests toward reconcilia- 
tion3 
Tripartism has, of course, never 
achieved perfect balance; any partner 
to the pact may be seen to dominate it. 
With the globalization of produc- 
tion relations, we are perceiving the 
collapse of tripartism-the erosion of 
unionism, the hegemony of the market 
and the subordination of the 
redistributive welfare state that we 
siderable withdrawal of the legitimacy 
accorded to the neo-liberal welfare 
state, expressed in anti-state move- 
ments, tax revolts and new elite ideolo- 
gies of self-interest and zero-altruism. 
These events, coupled with the severe 
polarization of incomes since the 
1980s, put considerable strain upon 
civil society, caught between the 
As I see it, global capitalism has abandoned its potential for 
"other-wiseness" by absorbing all otherness into a single market of 
success and failure. By rejecting the corporatist contract between 
business, government and hbour that has sojlened class differ- 
ences in the last halfcentury, globalism now subjects everyone to 
the dominion of monetarism and the market, downsizing 
organizations and breaking unions. 
have known for the last fdty years. We 
can now see that the neo-liberal state 
was committed to growth rather than 
redistribution and to inflation as the 
price of tripartism. Inflation, however, 
when combined with the stagnation of 
the mid-1970s, began to erode the na- 
tional income policies of tripartism. At 
the same time, the informal coopera- 
tion between the central agencies of 
government aqd the globalizing cor- 
porations was strengthened. 
Finally, the conflict between the in- 
terests of international capital accumu- 
lation and the national welfare of 
vulnerable groups has come to a head. 
National governments are now subor- 
dinate to international finance institu- 
tions that enforce the new world order 
of production: 
The state disengages from civil soci- 
ety-it reverses the trend toward in- 
terpenetration and blurring of the 
edges between state and society that 
corporatism promoted-in order to 
force more radically the adjustment 
of national economies to the world 
e~onomy.~ 
The result is that the civic capital 
expenditures of nation states are se- 
verely discounted, resulting in lower 
credit ratings, i.e. higher interest rates 
that further aggravate the national 
deficit. Yet, it is the welfare component 
of the deficit that is blamed for the 
overall effect. Currently, there is a con- 
anomic violence of marginalized 
groups and a generalized antipathy 
towards the elite composition of new 
scarcities and insecurities. 
As I see it, global capitalism has 
abandoned its potential for "other- 
wiseness" by absorbing all otherness 
into a single market of success and fail- 
ure. By rejecting the corporatist con- 
tract between business, govenunent 
and labour that has softened class dif- 
ferences in the last half century, glo- 
balism now subjects everyone to the 
dominion of monetarism and the mar- 
ket, downsizing organizations and 
breaking unions. Worse still, the frag- 
mentation of social citizenship is now 
accelerated by the New Right's curi- 
ous adoption of left cultural relativism 
to announce that there are no objective 
moral principles to guide the pursuit 
of social justice: 
Ideas of social justice and of basic 
needs, which form the threadbare 
clothing of contemporary social 
democratic movements, are of mini- 
mal help here. Criteria of desert and 
merit, such as enter into popular con- 
ceptions of social justice, are not ob- 
jective or publicly corrigible, but 
rather express private judgments 
grounded in varying moral tradi- 
tions. Conceptions of merit are not 
shared as a common moral inherit- 
ance, neutrally available to the inner 
city Moslem population of Binning- 
ham and the secularized profes- 
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